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Abstract: Postcapitalist commons are a growing area of interest in the efforts to gen-
erate alternatives to capitalism in the present. Commons are understood as self-organ-
ised collectives based around shared resources; yet postcapitalist commons have an
additional element, in operating within while projecting an “after” capitalism. This can
give rise to tensions since commons striving for postcapitalism also require a certain
amount of capital to survive and function within capitalism. FairCoop is a radical post-
capitalist commons that adopted the cryptocurrency FairCoin in 2014. FairCoop,
through FairCoin, was able to generate some trans-local connections through its use of
peer2peer technologies and was thus able to scale-up. Its design, however, was ulti-
mately unsustainable due to insufficiently clear boundaries from capital. After highlight-
ing the lack of commons boundaries around FairCoop, we identify some additional
commons-capital boundary design principles which could contribute to the sustainabil-
ity of future postcapitalist commons experiments that are seeking to scale.
Keywords: postcapitalism, commons, commons boundaries, cryptocurrencies, Fair-
Coop, FairCoin
Introduction
“We don’t believe in protesting, we are boycotting, we are creating something
new outside the existing system”, explained Igor, “in which we take out the gen-
eration of profit and exploitation within existing capitalist processes of exchange”.
Instead, he continued, “we value products through labour time and production
according to principles of cooperation, solidarity and ecological sustainability”.
This radical proposal to generate alternative conceptions of value outside of capi-
talism was presented in the Serbian countryside in Strazilovo, Stremski Karlovci,
Serbia in 2018, in a large house packed full of around 30 activists, anarchists,
squatters, philosophers, ecologists, and hackers (and often some combination of
these). The participants originated largely, but not exclusively, from Southern
European countries, such as Spain, Greece and Italy; but with a significant pres-
ence from Switzerland and Serbia.
Igor’s call to develop alternative relations of exchange was presented to a small
cooperative in Belgrade who were using self-made machines to make lamp shades
and other goods from recycled plastic. Igor introduced the distinctive and radical
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cryptocurrency, FairCoin. FairCoin has been built largely by an international
movement, FairCoop, that was gathered in Strazilovo for their annual Summer
Camp. FairCoop was founded in 2014 as a movement seeking to expand and
scale up the radical communal anarchist ideals and practices of the Catalan Inte-
gral Cooperative (CIC) in Catalonia—which after its creation in 2010 had some
success (in its early years) in generating “a self-sufficient economy that is autono-
mous from the state and the capitalist market” (Dafermos 2017:s4). Autonomy
here refers to some degree of self-control and relative independence from the
state and capitalism (De Angelis 2017a:228). FairCoop aimed to spread this vision
to different regions, based around peer2peer social organisation and free associa-
tion, and hacker ethics of breaking into the financial system to generate collective
alternatives (see Wark 2004). These principles were added to the ideals of Integral
Revolution associated with the CIC. Integral Revolution works towards a radical
transformation of economic and social life and “the abolition of all forms of domi-
nation” in favour of collective self-organisation and cooperation (see Inte-
graRevolucio 2020; see also FairCoop 2017a).
The cryptocurrency FairCoin is one of a number of different “altcoins” that
have been created since Bitcoin and its innovative “blockchain” design was put
forward in Nakamoto’s famous 2008 white paper. The blockchain is a clever piece
of cryptography in which “groups of transactions are gathered together into
‘blocks’ as they occur, and as each block is turned out it is added to the ‘chain’ of
all transactions” (Bridle 2019:xiii). This generates a means to process transactions
via an alternative “electronic payment system” (Nakamoto 2008). One of the cen-
tral appeals of Bitcoin for its followers and users is that the Bitcoin blockchain pro-
mises to cut “the middlemen” or third-party intermediaries (who also take a
transaction fee) out of processing transactions. Through its alternative approach
to “cryptographic authentication” (Maurer et al. 2013:265) the code serves to
authenticate transactions, thus (at least in theory) sidestepping fallible “human
sociality” (Maurer et al. 2013:263). Bitcoin has since attracted billions of dollars in
speculative investment, accompanied by voluminous business and investor hype.
While it has not succeeded as money in the sense of being widely used for day to
day transactions, it has set “a staging ground for debate” about the “role of
money in society” (Swartz 2018:623). Since their emergence in 2014, FairCoop
and FairCoin have been highlighted as a distinctive and important experiment
due to FairCoop being a radical commons alternative that has the potential to
expand and scale through peer2peer technologies (see for example Allon 2018;
Bauwens and Pazaitis 2019; Chatterton and Pusey 2020; Gerhardt 2020; Griziotti
2019; Scott 2016). FairCoop has sought to do this through utilising FairCoin’s
cryptocurrency blockchain design to facilitate the expansion of a commons that
(unlike Bitcoin) seeks to sidestep capitalist logics of private value extraction. That
said, its status in existing accounts tends to be a brief reference point rather than
assuming the position of detailed primary analysis, and this is what the following
investigation provides.
Commons are “a plurality of people (a community) sharing resources and gov-
erning them” with “their own relations and (re)production processes” that are
characterised by “commoning”, that is, social processes of cooperation and
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communities coming together (De Angelis 2017a:10–11; Huron 2015). To the
extent to which FairCoop through the governance of FairCoin reflects these fea-
tures, it constitutes a commons. In addition, here we consider FairCoop as a
postcapitalist commons that sought to scale through FairCoin (see Chatterton
2016; Chatterton and Pickerill 2010; Chatterton and Pusey 2020). FairCoop has
explicitly situated itself as postcapitalist (FairCoop 2017b), in being both in and
attempting to offer a transition to an oppositional after capitalism. Yet this post-
capitalist position clearly gives rise to tensions, since postcapitalist commons both
require some form of capital and need to be sufficiently bounded from capitalism
to retain their status as commons (see De Angelis 2017a:334). In the case of Fair-
Coin we will see that this problematic centred around questions of price and con-
vertibility, and FairCoin’s unusual two price model. FairCoin had two prices, one
price was established through trading on external cryptocurrency exchanges in
which FairCoin was exchanged for other cryptocurrencies, principally Bitcoin; and
a second price that operated internally within FairCoop, established and decided
by the FairCoop commons itself.
As the two valuations of FairCoin (the FairCoop valuation and the external cryp-
tocurrency exchange price) diverged in 2018, FairCoop was faced with increasing
pressures around the limited resource of capital, in the form of the Euro—the
dominant government fiat currency in the regions where FairCoin was most
widely used. The key concepts through which we analyse this problematic are the
notion of commons boundaries (Ostrom 1990) and De Angelis’ (2017a, 2017b)
conception of a “filtering membrane”. We argue that postcapitalist commons
need clear boundaries to be protected from the encroachment of the values and
practices of capital, which are centred around state backed fiat currency (De
Angelis 2017a:313) and private value extraction from the commons. Yet because
some capital is necessary to sustain the commons, a “filtering membrane” (De
Angelis 2017b:228–229) is required for the postcapitalist commons to be sustain-
able. The “filtering membrane” is a selective filter which is intended to secure
capital for certain items that cannot be acquired internally within the commons
(such as electricity and heating), but with certain boundaries to prevent the ero-
sion or weakening of the shared (postcapitalist) values of the commons itself.
While capitalism, as Gibson-Graham (2006:198) characterise it, is an “exploitative
class process in which surplus labor is appropriated from the direct producers in
value” by nonproducers, who in this process appropriate capital. Capital here is
intimately connected with state backed fiat currency, since we have a system of
privatised money creation in which commercial banks generate money by lending
it at interest (Mellor 2010).
Two principal research questions frame the following investigation: First, is Fair-
Coop and FairCoin a viable postcapitalist commons and cryptocurrency that is
sustainable? For De Angelis (2017a:122) sustainability means the establishment of
a “series of stock-flow relations necessary to (re)produce” the commons (emphasis
added), through a structure determining the extraction of limited resources (see
De Angelis 2017a:167; Ostrom 1990:33). If limited resources are extracted exces-
sively in a way that outpaces their inflow into the commons, the reproduction of
the commons is endangered. Second, what can FairCoin and FairCoop tell us
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about the potential to generate scalable postcapitalist commons? Being scalable
means the extent to which the commons can spread beyond the specific site
(Gerhardt 2020) potentially to multiple other sites and regions, and thus become
trans-local in scale. As we will see the answer to the first question is negative for
the reasons that emerge from the response to the second. FairCoop shows us that
within postcapitalist commons, the boundaries between commons and capital
need to be firmer in order to clearly limit the extraction of scarce resources (in
this case state backed fiat currency). Thus, the principal contribution of this paper
is to outline some additional commons boundary design principles that are neces-
sary for postcapitalist commons to be scalable and sustainable. We develop a
more extensive and radical conception of Ostrom’s (1990:90) first design
principle of commons boundaries—principally for Ostrom the rights to withdraw
resources and the boundaries around a shared resource—by using the limits of
the FairCoop case to think through a firmer basis for more sustainable and
scalable postcapitalist commons.
We begin by outlining what is significant about the case and then situate our
own positionality and methodology in the investigation that follows. The investi-
gation then proceeds across four sections: First by drawing on some critical con-
ceptions of money to highlight its fundamental social and political importance
(see Ingham 2004), and connecting this to what is distinctive about postcapitalist
commons (Chatterton 2016; Gerhardt 2020). Here the importance of commons
boundaries is also highlighted, which serves to frame our investigation. We then
situate FairCoin in the broader field of cryptocurrency commons experiments.
Second, we outline how FairCoop generated significant trans-local commoning
through FairCoin. Third, we focus on why this scaling was ultimately unsustain-
able due to FairCoop having insufficient boundaries from capital. In the fourth
section, drawing from the lessons of the FairCoop case, we argue that the insuffi-
cient commons boundaries of FairCoop highlights how scalable postcapitalist
commons require some additional commons boundary design principles (Ostrom
1990) to be viable and sustainable.
A Note on the Case Study and Method
FairCoin is the most well-established cryptocurrency that is governed by a com-
mons (Gerhardt 2020). While a number of commons based blockchain proposals
have emerged in recent years (see for example Economic Space Agency 2020;
Pazaitis et al. 2017), these designs are often at blueprint stage. At its height in
2017, FairCoin had a significant community of thousands of users, merchants and
developers—with a particular concentration in Southern Europe. FairCoop and
FairCoin are particularly significant in at least three principal respects, first in being
the first explicitly postcapitalist cryptocurrency experiment. In its glossy 2017 leaf-
let, FairCoop is described as a “self-managed financial” collective for “a transition
to a postcapitalist era” (FairCoop 2017b). Second, in seeking to be trans-local,
inclusive and scalable, FairCoop was designed to be an open and expansive post-
capitalist commons, which all those sympathetic to its values could link into, prin-
cipally by facilitating self-organisation around FairCoin in different regions (Duran
862 Antipode
ª 2020 The Authors. Antipode published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Antipode Foundation Ltd.
2018), thereby addressing an often highlighted problematic of lack of scalability
in commons experiments (see for example Gerhardt 2020; Griziotti 2019). Third,
through its emergence from the CIC and its close association with Enric Duran—
the key founder in 2014—FairCoin presents a rare example of a cryptocurrency
with concrete links to self-organised, collectivist anarchist and squatter communi-
ties (O’Leary 2018). These distinctive features make FairCoop an important exam-
ple of an ambitious “post-capitalist collaborative commons” experiment (Gerhardt
2020). Much can be learnt from the case to establish what the potential is for
such experiments and what challenges they might face when seeking to expand.
It should also be noted that FairCoop and FairCoin are currently best described as
being in a state of stasis, many participants and communities have exited the pro-
ject largely for reasons that we will go on to discuss; however, the FairCoin block-
chain can still process transactions, and there are a small group of developers
who continue to contribute to its development.
In terms of our own positionality, one of the authors has been both fascinated
by and sympathetic to this attempt to realise a scalable postcapitalist commons in
practice. In this respect our approach shares some methodological affinities with
Gibson-Graham’s (2006:165) position in A Postcapitalist Politics, “the collectivities
involved in constituting these economies include ourselves and other researchers
who are engaged (often collaboratively with the participants) in theorizing and
analyzing individual projects, thereby making them available and transportable as
models or inspirations”. One of the authors has been a participant in FairCoop for
over two years; has produced and proof-read various FairCoop blogposts; has
been actively involved in hundreds of meetings both online and in person; has
participated in two FairCoop summer camps in Novi Sad, Serbia, and Jura,
Switzerland; as well as being involved in numerous online and in person conversa-
tions about FairCoin and FairCoop over these years. This position of activist and
researcher (see Reedy and King 2019) was complimented by semi-structured
interviews with eight activists heavily involved in FairCoin and FairCoop, including
some of its founders. These interviews have been coded and re-coded into partic-
ular key themes and topics that emerged, while the first names and the involve-
ment of some respondents is detailed, a couple requested anonymity which has
been respected in the analysis that follows.
While one of the authors has been heavily involved in the FairCoop movement,
the other author has not been active in the movement. We have thus deliberately
adopted a strategy of co-authorship to enable at least some degree of critical dis-
tance in the analysis that follows (see Reedy and King 2019)—in seeking to com-
bine both a more engaged and a more independent perspective. As writers and
activists, we also have a responsibility to consider tensions, conflicts and chal-
lenges around building postcapitalist commons. First, because it would be mis-
leading to do otherwise when challenges exist. Second, because processes of
forging and sustaining “postcapitalist” alternatives in common necessarily entails
risk (Chatterton 2016) and a need to constantly respond to fresh challenges
through rethinking and experimentation. Before discussing our case, in the follow-
ing section we set the investigation into the broader context of money and post-
capitalist commons, then highlight the need for postcapitalist commons to
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establish certain clear boundaries in relation to capital. Following this, we situate
FairCoop and FairCoin in relation to the existing literature on cryptocurrencies
and the commons.
Money and the Postcapitalist Commons
Money is in essence a social relation (Dodd 2014:8–9) although the social aspects
of money are often overlooked in conventional macro-economic models (Hutchin-
son et al. 2002; Ingham 2001:307). As Brunton (2019:14) notes, money serves a
key function in the “production and reproduction of shared norms and social
cohesion”. Furthermore, money in the form of government backed fiat currency
is a fundamental social relation underpinning capitalism through the monetisation
of debt via bank lending (Ingham 2004:194). In addition, money is an important
political relation—in incarnating particular values that are contestable and con-
tested—one that generates binding social ties (see Dodd 2014:372). As Hutchin-
son et al. (2002:13) argue, privatised money creation in which commercial banks
generate money by lending at interest and charging fees, is ultimately the “bot-
tom line” of capitalism (see also Ingham 2004:13). A bottom line that is “deter-
mined by an assumption that economic activity only takes place within a
capitalized market system” which is both socially and ecologically destructive
(Hutchinson et al. 2002:1). According to Hutchinson et al. (2002:41), “catas-
trophic environmental collapse” is the most likely scenario in a monetary system
in “which every incentive leads to the destruction of natural resources” in order
to extract capital.
Fundamental questions around our “privatized system of money creation” in
which commercial banks effectively generate money through loans (Mellor 2010)
—with all of its resulting imbalances, inequalities and fundamental unsustainability
—have assumed a higher profile in public and academic debate since the financial
crisis of 2008. Radical left and progressive alternative conceptions of money tend
to take two forms: One moves towards a reimagining of the role of the state in
actively overseeing the creation of money for social purposes (see Hutchinson
et al. 2002; Mellor 2010; Positive Money 2015); although such approaches have
been criticised for a lack of strategic sense of how citizens might collectively drive
the state to democratise and fundamentally transform the money system (see for
example North 2016). The other approach sees greater potential in the myriad of
self-organised alternative currencies, and their capacity to generate partial but dis-
tinctive tokens of exchange (Dodd 2014; North 2007). Critics of alternative cur-
rencies point to their status as a partial subordinate unit of account to the
dominant state backed fiat currency system (see Ingham 2004; Ould-Ahmed
2010). Despite these limitations, some have highlighted the potential role of radi-
cal alternative currencies, like FairCoin, to support a commons transition to post-
capitalist futures (Chatterton and Pusey 2020; Gerhardt 2020). The interest in
FairCoin in these recent accounts stems from it being an alternative cryptocur-
rency which is able to cover a much wider economic realm than is typically the
case with alternative currencies—since communities and individuals anywhere are
free to download a FairCoin wallet, sell goods in FairCoin online or in person, and
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link up with the FairCoop commons. It is thus not confined to a specific site or
region as often tends to be the case with commons organisations (see Gerhardt
2020). Furthermore, Bitcoin as the first and most recognised cryptocurrency—de-
spite its clear limitations as a commons (O’Dwyer 2014, 2015)—has proven to be
strikingly resilient, and is now in its twelfth year of existence. FairCoop, through
FairCoin, presents a distinctive attempt to build an alternative cryptocurrency with
explicitly political aims, based around developing a commons oriented, postcapi-
talist monetary system (see FairCoop 2017b; Gerhardt 2020).
Commons Boundaries and Postcapitalism
While there is now an expansive literature on the commons, there is a reoccurring
ambiguity around the distinction between non-capitalist and anti-capitalist com-
mons. Commons today have been positioned as a clear adversarial alternative to
capitalism (De Angelis 2017b; Ruivenkamp and Hilton 2017:7); or, as essentially
non-capitalist (Ostrom 1990). The term postcapitalist commons adds an impor-
tant additional nuance to these conceptions since it denotes a commons which
recognises its own hybridity, in being both against but simultaneously operating
within capitalism, with all of the accompanying challenges this gives rise to. This
postcapitalistic aspect of FairCoop was neatly reflected by Chris from Decentrale,
Mont-Soleil, Jura, Switzerland. Decentrale is a space for diverse self-organised and
cooperative projects in the region. Chris has been heavily involved in FairCoop
since 2016 and he saw strong potential overlaps with FairCoop’s efforts to gener-
ate transitional alternatives:
It offers an opportunity to create something that interacts with the capitalist system
to some extent and interacts with a new reality that is postcapitalistic that can be cre-
ated, and I see FairCoin as a bridge element between the two.
This “bridge element” in the transition from within capitalism to generate alterna-
tive futures after capitalism, is a strategic and practical one that can only be built
through risk taking and experimentation (see Chatterton 2016) in postcapitalist
commons. In Chatterton and Pusey’s (2020:40) helpful outline of different
streams in the postcapitalist literature, the work related to autonomous postcapi-
talist commons is characterised by analysis of “novel forms of community-based
doing and common ownership of the economy that has the potential to scale
beyond self-governing micro-local experiments”.
Yet it should be noted that capital in the form of state backed fiat currency is
often required in some form due to “the vast array of useful products that com-
mons do not have any other ways of procuring but through engaging in mone-
tary payments” (De Angelis 2017a:334). This gives rise to the central problematic
of postcapitalist commons that we investigate here: How can commons filter in
enough capital to be resilient and sustainable, but at the same time be sufficiently
bounded from capital to prevent the ideals and practices of the commons becom-
ing endangered through the predominance of money in the form of state backed
fiat currency (see De Angelis 2017a:317)? The shape and form of the “filtering
membrane” (De Angelis 2017b:228–229) through which capital enters into—and
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is extracted from—the commons must be decided and monitored by actors to
ensure that capital does not endanger the commons, for example, through an
unsustainable extraction of the dominant state sanctioned currency, in the case of
FairCoop, Euros. There are a variety of different ways in which capital can be fil-
tered into the commons in a manner that maintains some boundaries, including
crowdfunding (although there are obvious limits to the extent to which this can
be repeatedly used), membership contributions, the commons itself producing
and selling particular goods and services for state backed fiat currency, or poten-
tially through monthly instalments from participants who have a steady and suffi-
cient income in state backed fiat currency (see Fairo 2019).
One interesting example of filtering capital into a postcapitalist commons is the
case of the Low Impact Living Affordable Community (LILAC) housing cooperative
in Leeds, UK (Chatterton 2016), in which all residents pay 35% of their net
income in equity shares into a Mutual Home Ownership Society (MHOS) (Chatter-
ton 2016:408). This presents an innovative way of filtering capital into the com-
mons but keeping this bounded so that property speculation and private
incentives around house price increases do not crowd out the shared values and
practices of the commons. Since rather than contributing a certain amount of
money in monthly instalments to paying off a private mortgage, residents are
contributing a fixed proportion of their income to the shared commons resources
of the MHOS. While LILAC presents an interesting, important and innovative case
of a bounded postcapitalist commons, it is also a “single-place based experiment”
(Chatterton 2016:410), and there are thus limits to its scalability (see Chatterton
2016:409; Gerhardt 2020).
The filtering membrane (De Angelis 2017b:228) through which capital is
brought into the commons must be monitored to ensure that sufficient capital is
entering for the commons to be sustainable. Furthermore, if there is a significant
reduction of capital inflow, the scale and size of the postcapitalist commons will
require adjustment and/or scaling back. Ostrom’s (1990) famous account of com-
mon pool resources (CPRs) provides further clarification. CPRs are natural
resources that are self-governed by communities, in which the exclusion of benefi-
ciaries is costly and in which the exploitation by one user reduces resource avail-
ability for others (Ostrom et al. 1999). By thinking through the experience of
individuals in field settings, Ostrom is able to identify some design principles for
CPRs to be self-governed in a manner which is viable and sustainable. It is the first
of these principles that is most relevant to our investigation of postcapitalism and
commons boundaries: “Individuals or households who have rights to withdraw
resources units from the CPR must be clearly defined, as must the boundaries of
the CPR itself” (Ostrom 1990:90).
There is an emphasis in Ostrom’s account on limiting extraction to ensure the
sustainability of resources within the commons. The two key principles of CPR
boundaries can be summarised as exclusion, in which some actors are unable to
extract the shared resources from the CPR system; and subtraction in which the
limited nature of the resource means excessive extraction by some will limit the
availability of the resource for others (O’Mahony 2003). The crucial and scarce
commons resource within FairCoop—as it sought to build and spread FairCoin as
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an alternative currency to help generate a transition to postcapitalism—was
money in the form of state backed fiat currency, predominantly Euros, as this was
the dominant currency in the regions where FairCoin was most widely used,
including Spain, Greece and Italy.
Alternative currencies like FairCoin are non-exclusive since it is difficult to pre-
vent someone acquiring an alternative currency; and they can also be non-sub-
tractive since the rate of release and issuance of the currency can be determined
by the commons itself. However, if the commons promises to exchange the alter-
native currency for state backed fiat currency (in this case Euros)—as FairCoop did
—a subtraction of limited capital resources is enabled through the commons. This
highlights how money in the form of state backed fiat currency presents a signifi-
cant challenge in regard to commons boundaries. Postcapitalist commons must
find a way to filter state backed fiat currency money into the commons, and limit
its extraction, so that it sustains and does not weaken the cooperative and con-
vivial aspects of the commons.
Ostrom focuses on non-capitalist CPRs and her work has little critical engage-
ment with the role of money (Vercellone et al. 2015:22). Her approach has also
been characterised as overly rationalist and methodologically individualist (O’Dw-
yer 2015; Ruivenkamp and Hilton 2017:3; Vercellone et al. 2015). Yet we argue
here that these critiques do not invalidate the relevance of her work for thinking
through the basis for more radical and sustainable postcapitalist commons.
Ostrom’s framework does not require individuals to be rationalist in any purely
individualist sense but allows for more collectivist and convivial values such as
mutual aid, shared love and solidarity to sustain commons (see De Angelis
2017a:158). The crucial element of Ostrom’s account is identifying appropriate
design principles. Postcapitalist commons which to some extent rely on capital (a
subtractable resource) must have boundaries and design principles in place to
guard against the self-interested extraction of capital by (a) given actor(s) who
may conceivably enter and seek to extract capital from the commons at some
future point. The search for additional design principles to better secure the sus-
tainability of scalable postcapitalist commons will be at the core of the following
analysis of FairCoop.
Blockchain Cryptography and the Commons
In De Angelis’ (2017a:241) analytical framework for studying commons, “bound-
ary commoning” refers to interconnections and scaling by forging links or bring-
ing in other collectives from different sites, which is itself a process of
reconfiguring boundaries. Blockchain and peer2peer technologies are relevant
here as they are devices that may facilitate commons scaling (see for example Bol-
lier 2015; Gerhardt 2020; O’Dwyer 2015). Since its creation in 2009, Bitcoin and
its blockchain cryptography have served as an important staging post for debates
around the role of money in society (Dodd 2018; Du Pont 2019; Swartz 2018).
The often repeated celebratory narrative propounded by a certain species of eco-
nomic libertarian (usually a white, male and heterosexual one) attracted to Bitcoin
(Du Pont 2019) is that the blockchain removes the need for third party
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intermediaries in systems of payment and can thus disintermediate transactions
(Dodd 2018:50), thereby bypassing central authorities and banks. The blockchain
can be described as a “shared ledger”, a shared record of transactions and essen-
tially a “chain” of “blocks” (Swartz 2017:83). In Bitcoin cryptography these blocks
are added to through an energy intensive process known as mining in which
computers compete to discover a hash code. The growth of Bitcoin in the last 10
years has been accompanied by disappointment and extensive critique amongst
those who stress the potential of open source blockchain technologies to develop
scalable peer2peer commons alternatives (De Filippi 2015; Kostakis and Giotitsas
2014; O’Dwyer 2014, 2015). Bitcoin instead has become a plaything for libertar-
ian investors and free market ideologues (see Golumbia 2016). As De Filippi and
Loveluck (2016:5) note, Bitcoin’s design principles present a “profoundly market-
driven approach to social coordination”—through the overarching focus on
incentivisation through self-interest (O’Dwyer 2015), and the development of an
elite “aristocracy” of powerful miners and a handful of developers who make the
key decisions around how the blockchain develops (Kostakis and Giotitsas 2014).
In characterising different cryptocurrency and blockchain communities, Swartz
(2017, 2018) makes a helpful distinction between “digital metallists” and “infras-
tructural mutualists”. Digital metallists stress the benefits of Bitcoin as an asset
underpinned by “trustless” cryptography, in being both limited in supply in a sim-
ilar fashion to gold and enabling “autonomous market relations” (Swartz 2017;
see also Maurer et al. 2013). Radical infrastructural mutualists, meanwhile, believe
in the potential of the blockchain as an autonomous and decentralised infrastruc-
ture that can enable the “collaborative creation and distribution of value”
between peers (Swartz 2017:86). One distinct group that have emerged here can
be described as commons based digital mutualists, who see blockchain technol-
ogy and peer2peer as something that can help to facilitate commons based
around sharing and open source cooperation (Bauwens et al. 2019; Bollier 2015;
De Filippi 2015; Pazaitis et al. 2017). O’Dwyer (2015) for example points to the
potential of the blockchain to generate new forms of “commons based peer pro-
duction”, while Bollier (2015) argues that “blockchain technology could help us
build some refreshing, effective and socially progressive types of commons”. One
subspecies of radical commons digital mutualists are postcapitalist digital mutual-
ists, who explicitly seek to realise scalable alternatives to capitalism through peer2-
peer blockchain technologies (see Bauwens and Pazaitis 2019; Economic Space
Agency 2020; FairCoop 2017b; Gerhardt 2020).
In terms of its underlying cryptography, FairCoin was designed to help facilitate
this transition to postcapitalist futures through an alternative, collectivist and sus-
tainable blockchain design. The key innovation here is that of Cooperatively Vali-
dated Nodes (CVNs), in which rather than competing—as is the case with Bitcoin
mining—a collection of between 10 and 20 computers take it in turns to validate
transactions every three minutes which is then signed off by the other CVNs in a
“consensus algorithm” (K€onig et al. 2018), a process in which the total number
of coins is fixed. This leads to dramatically less energy consumption than Bitcoin
in validating transactions, and consequently participants often refer to it as an
“ecological blockchain” design (K€onig et al. 2018).
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In addition, there is a meshing of the technical, social and political in the man-
ner in which CVNs are approved by monthly online FairCoop general assemblies.
Those seeking to run CVNs put themselves forward, explain why they would like
to contribute and outline their credentials, which must be supported by two other
participants and then approved by consensus. The CVN is described in the Fair-
Coin white paper as “a socio-technical sculpture” which is authorised through a
“social p2p consensus mechanism” (K€onig et al. 2018:7). One interview respon-
dent, Vale, who had been heavily involved in activism in Barcelona and is now
based in the UK, explained her motivation for running a CVN as follows:
The main reason for joining the movement was the proof of cooperation blockchain
because I thought that was really something ... I’m quite good with technology so I
set up SiQuoBern, SiQuoBern is a node in the blockchain, I set myself up to run a
node in the FairCoin blockchain but of course in order to run a node you need to
demonstrate you’re a good person.
A key appeal of the FairCoin blockchain is the potential it offers as an alternative,
radical currency that can scale to multiple regions through peer2peer technology,
and this aspect was continually stressed by different interview respondents. Thus,
before exploring FairCoop’s insufficient boundaries in relation to capital, we
expand on the opportunities FairCoin offered for expansive, trans-local FairCoop
boundary commoning.
The FairCoop Commons
FairCoop was founded in 2014 by Enric Duran. Duran became famous within acti-
vist communities by creating multiple overdrafts in different banks across Spain in
2008 through fake solvency, and then using the roughly half a million Euros gen-
erated to support anti-capitalist movements in Catalonia and across Spain. As
Enric Duran (2019) stressed, “I envisage FairCoop will be for the entire world
what the CIC is to Catalonia: An open self-governed worldwide financial co-op
independent of banks or states”. Duran has served as a figurehead in the early
years of FairCoop in giving the movement a disobedient, communal anarchist
ethos as it aims to be autonomous from both capitalism and the state. In Duran’s
original vision, FairCoin would address the challenge of scale facing many com-
mons (see Gerhardt 2020) through peer2peer technology.
A Trans-Local Commons
FairCoop is organised on the basis of local nodes, and over 50 local nodes have
been created in different regions, principally in Southern Europe—although the
vast majority of these are no longer active at the time of writing. These local
nodes are self-organised and radically autonomous as long as they are aligned
with FairCoop’s principles of peer2peer collaboration, Integral Revolution (Inte-
graRevolucio 2020), and hacker ethics (FairCoop 2017a). Hacker ethics is under-
stood through some key collective principles that include free information and
sharing, and open public data (Interview, Duran, 2019; see also FairCoop 2017a).
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Local nodes are meant to build alternative economies and they make decisions
through face-to-face assemblies. The nodes also operate Points of Exchange (POE)
where people can exchange government backed fiat currency for FairCoin. The
most active local nodes had FairSpots, sites which provide a POE, a place that
goods can be bought and sold in FairCoin, and somewhere that political meet-
ings could be held. The first FairSpot was created in central Athens, Exarcheia in
2017, which sold items in FairCoin including olive oil, coffee, herbs, pasta sauces
and syrup. In Novi Sad, Serbia, the FairSpot also had a small garden, which
meant that fresh, organically grown fruit and vegetables could be sold in FairCoin
(see FairCoop 2018a). FairCoin can be used by downloading a wallet app, which
allows the purchase of FairCoin using government fiat currency or other cryp-
tocurrencies. The wallet also enables exchanges through a local node anywhere
where FairCoin is active. Transactions can then be made either via laptops in
which addresses can be copied and pasted, via FairPay cards, or via Android
phones and the scanning of QR codes. In addition, there is also a Fair Market
website (which continues to exist, although with a vastly reduced range of goods
offered from when FairCoin and FairCoop was at its height in 2017) where items
such as eggs, olive oil, lip balms, herbs, fruit and vegetables can be bought in
FairCoin. Some cities, including London, also had temporary accommodation that
was advertised on the Fair Market website and that can be paid for in FairCoin.
The governance of FairCoop and FairCoin operated on two levels. Local level
FairCoop groups held regular in person local node meetings and, at a global level,
collective discussions occurred—and continue to occur in more limited form—
across a broad range of groups on Telegram and via FairChat—an open source
software messaging application. These different groups focus on issues such as
economic strategy; the development of open source applications; coordination
between FairCoop local nodes; an independent bank, Bank of the Commons; and
a welcome group. At a trans-local level, there are open online monthly meetings
including the General Assembly, amongst others (FairCoop 2018b). Participants
can make proposals which are discussed in the General Assembly or relevant
groups with the aim of achieving a form of consensus, which does not aim for
100% agreement in each case. Individuals can passively disagree or actively block
a proposal—and it is only when a participant blocks a proposal that it cannot be
implemented. Individuals who block decisions must provide a substantive reason,
and ideally offer an alternative. It must be noted that the most intractable issues
that FairCoop has faced are related to the price and convertibility of FairCoin—
that is, around what rate FairCoin can be exchanged back to Euros or whether
this should be offered at all within FairCoop, and how FairCoin should be valued
in relation to Euros when goods and services are priced. This will be the central
focus of the following section, but it is worth noting that as a result of the impos-
sibility of finding any consensus here, FairCoop adopted a more decentralised
approach to questions around FairCoin price and convertibility, which is now left
to local nodes in different regions to decide.
At an open FairCoop local node experience sharing session during the 2018
Summer Camp in Serbia, one of the participants described the activities of the
FairCoop local node in Heraklion in Crete. Michaelis, an activist and a member of
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the Integral Cooperative based there, described how they had been able to coop-
erate with a social currency in the region:
In every event of the Integral Cooperative we try to promote both coins, for example
the autonomous market has helped us to extend a lot to other people. For example,
we had a desk with a couple of computers and one guy was speaking about the social
currency, I was speaking to people about FairCoin.
The quote above reflects a significant instance of boundary commoning. First, we
can see from the quote that the ideals of the CIC have spread, and a similar
model has been adopted in Heraklion through the generation of its own Integral
Cooperative. Second, commoning occurs through the use of open street markets
where producers and consumers use FairCoin and other social currencies. FairCoin
was also working alongside an existing local social currency, thus presenting a sig-
nificant instance of forging interconnections in a local context. A significant num-
ber of other instances of boundary commoning have been facilitated through
FairCoin over the years, including the Iberian Routes project during 2018–2019 in
which on a monthly basis food (including fruit, pasta, herbs, olive oil and beer)
and cleaning products were transported to different regions across the Iberian
Peninsula and exchanged for FairCoin, through a coordinated project which
involved up to eight different local nodes in the region, including Galiza, Manresa
and Tarragona (see FairCoop Forum 2018).
Returning to the experiences in Heraklion, as Michaelis went on to explain:
The rest of the city sees us as an alternative to the market, as an anti-capitalistic move-
ment. As you know some of them like it, we try to welcome and incorporate anyone
who is interested, and we try to present ourselves as a transition movement who
needs the social interaction.
Michaelis’ stress on openness and a desire to “incorporate anyone who is inter-
ested” is reflective of the openness of FairCoop’s design model with very little
stress on commons boundaries. We can also see here the extent to which the
postcapitalism within FairCoop is seen by some participants and external obser-
vers as having an anti-capitalist flavour (Chatterton and Pickerill 2010). FairCoop
however is rather a postcapitalist movement as it sought to generate a source of
capital through FairCoin being openly tradable on different cryptocurrency
exchanges. This led to the key problem of FairCoin’s two prices and insufficient
boundaries from capital, to which we now turn.
Hacking the Market? The Two Price Model
FairCoin was characterised by an unusual dual price structure. FairCoop and the
community of activists around it make decisions about governance, values, and
the adoption and development of software applications. Crucially, FairCoop gen-
eral assemblies also established a FairCoop exchange rate at which goods and ser-
vices were priced in FairCoin, and at which the exchange from FairCoin to Euros
was promised for FairCoop participants and merchants (FairCoop 2019). Yet Fair-
Coin can also be purchased on external cryptocurrency exchanges outside
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FairCoop. Crypto exchanges are a crucial feature of the cryptocurrency world
since they are the principal means of acquiring cryptocurrencies in a competitive
online bidding process. At different points FairCoin was listed on different cryp-
tocurrency exchanges—the most high profile one being Bittrex, which it was
delisted from in March 2018, after the community refused to name a CEO or fulfil
certain regulatory requirements necessary to be classified as a security (FairCoin
2018).1 Because the price of FairCoin on these external exchanges was highly
volatile, the exchange rate that was established by the general assemblies was
seen as a way of protecting merchants and users from the volatility of cryptocur-
rency exchanges. It was meant to ensure that the price of goods and the value
of FairCoin remained relatively stable within the postcapitalist commons. In addi-
tion, there was a mechanism for channelling capital into the commons: a rising
value of FairCoin on external cryptocurrency exchanges would enhance the com-
mons by increasing the relative value of FairCoin held by participants in FairCoop.
The general assemblies would respond to the increasing value of FairCoin on
external cryptocurrency exchanges by raising the agreed FairCoin-to-Euro
exchange rate within FairCoop—which would be decided through consensus
decision-making.
This brings us to the key problematic in our investigation of FairCoop and com-
mons boundaries: How can capital be extracted and used for the good of the
commons and its reproduction to the ends of “love, solidarity and conviviality”
(De Angelis 2017a:339) in a manner that protects and supports the alternative
that is being built? As Chris, based in Jura, noted to one of us, as a postcapitalist
commons FairCoop sought to use FairCoin as a filter that:
... would ideally be a membrane that interacts both with the capitalist system and
with the Fair economy that is postcapitalistic or going towards postcapitalistic ... That
doesn’t mean that it completely 100% prevents capitalistic value extraction it just
means that it prevents value extraction of capitalistic behaviour so that its more that
you get a value benefit into the Fair economy.
The nature of the filtering membrane is that some things can filter through and
not others (De Angelis 2017b:229), so that capital can be filtered into the com-
mons, while “capitalistic value extraction” needs to be prevented from seeping
into the internal values and practices of the commons itself. Such a boundary is
always an unstable one and, as Chris notes, cannot be absolute, because the post-
capitalist commons is necessarily in capitalism, while simultaneously seeking to
retain autonomy and boundaries from it. Yet this highlights a key problem that
faced FairCoop and FairCoin: FairCoin trading is essentially open and unrestricted
on external cryptocurrency exchanges. To the extent to which there were any
commons boundaries these were established through FairCoop; yet FairCoop itself
had no membership and was essentially open. The only recognised boundary was
that a couple of FairCoop participants would need to vouch for people before
they could become involved in governance and core tasks within the commons.
So, in effect FairCoin had no boundaries around external trading and investment,
while FairCoop had no membership and minimal commons boundaries in terms
of who could participate.
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Bauwens et al. (2019:7) describe the processes through which capital is filtered
into the commons as one of “transvestment”. It should be noted that commons
that are reliant on such strategies need to generate capital and returns to be sus-
tainable. As a transvestment strategy, FairCoop sought, ultimately unsuccessfully,
to use FairCoin’s cryptocurrency exchange market value as a means to extract
capital. FairCoin could be purchased and exchanged for goods and services at a
set internal community FairCoop rate, decided via consensus in online general
assemblies; but external cryptocurrency exchanges also presented opportunities
to trade FairCoin for different cryptocurrencies (primarily Bitcoin) where its value
was far more volatile and subject to the decisions of cryptocurrency traders and
investors.
The initial, overly optimistic, model was based on the premise that the appreci-
ating cryptocurrency exchange market price could be hacked to sustain and fur-
ther the postcapitalist commons, by selling or buying FairCoin on cryptocurrency
exchanges. As one anonymous interview respondent explained, it:
... was about creating a commons ... so that value shifts from private property to the
commons, this was also connected to the hack of the markets so that money from the
capitalistic market can flow into something like FairCoin and can be extracted for the
common good.
This has some resonances with Wark’s (2004:§034) conception of hacking in
which there is the generation of “new abstractions” through breaking into “the
abstraction of property” and overcoming its limitations (Wark 2004:§036). But as
Wark (2004:§081) also notes, the hacker class “has a tactical interest in the repre-
sentation of the hack as property, as something from which a source of income
may be derived”, in this case FairCoin as property. Such hacking is often limited
to specific public interventions, or momentarily breaking into a given private con-
figuration of information, assets, or property, as was the case with Duran’s actions
against the banks in 2008. It is not clear how it can forge a durable strategy to
sustain the needs of a postcapitalist commons indefinitely; since capital is likely to
change its approach to guard against future hacks.
The appreciation of FairCoin’s exchange value on external cryptocurrency
exchanges in 2016–2017 coincided with the expansion of the movement through
the creation of different FairCoop local nodes. However, this external market valu-
ation ultimately mirrored Bitcoin’s volatile price on different cryptocurrency
exchanges, which entered a boom phase in the late months of 2017, only to fall
from around $19,000 per Bitcoin at its height in December 2017 to below $4000
in October 2018 (Ouimet 2019). FairCoop’s internal community exchange value
rose up to 1.2 Euros to reflect its rising value on cryptocurrency exchanges in Jan-
uary 2018. But, like Bitcoin, its value on cryptocurrency exchanges dropped dra-
matically in the ensuing months and (unlike Bitcoin) did not subsequently
recover. Due to the need for consensus within general assemblies and a series of
internal disagreements, the community price was not subsequently lowered with
the drastic cryptocurrency exchange market price drop.
The divergence between the two FairCoin prices led to increasing bifurcation
and division within the FairCoop community. Guy, based in Spain, was involved
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in the Peer2Peer Social Organization group—a group of researchers reporting on
peer2peer and open source alternatives. Guy worked on developing the original
WordPress FairCoop site when visiting Enric Duran in hiding in 2014, and has
subsequently collaborated with FairCoop on and off, while also being construc-
tively critical of the dynamics that have unfolded. As he noted:
There’s really two types of people who are interested in FairCoop and FairCoin. It’s
the people who basically bought a load to speculate that’s their primary focus and
they want it to be fair as well ... [and] there’s the other people who don’t care at all
about the speculation they want it to be just the official price and they just want to
buy and sell at the official price ... So, then it’s kind of stuck because you need a con-
sensus.
Some communities within FairCoop felt that the commons should hold firm and
ignore the drop in cryptocurrency exchange market price, on the basis that the
FairCoop commons itself could guarantee the fixed higher exchange rate of 1.2
Euros by continuing to offer goods and services internally (Duran 2018). But com-
mitments had been made by FairCoop to exchange FairCoin back to Euros at this
rate (FairCoop 2019). For FairCoop, which has no official membership, there was
no clear way to prevent people from taking advantage of price differences via
arbitrage. The problem of arbitrage is less pressing for exchanges at smaller scale,
such as a daily supply of fruit and vegetables purchased in FairCoin from a com-
mitted FairCoop merchant. But arbitrage generated a clear loss for FairCoop if
someone bought cheap FairCoin from cryptocurrency exchanges and then
bought goods with these FairCoin, and the merchant then asked FairCoop for
their FairCoin to be exchanged back to Euros at the higher, official FairCoop
exchange rate. This problem of arbitrage was extenuated by the selling of certain
high-end technological products in FairCoin, particularly electric bikes. These bikes
were priced in FairCoin at the higher rate of 1.2 Euros-a-FairCoin. The merchants
selling these bikes then asked FairCoop to exchange these FairCoin into Euros at
the 1.2 Euro rate, as promised (FairCoop 2019). But these FairCoin could easily
have been acquired by consumers from external cryptocurrency exchanges at a
fraction of the cost, such as 0.11 Euros-a-FairCoin, which was FairCoin’s cryp-
tocurrency exchange market price on 19 March 2020 (FairPlayGround Statistics
2020). The expectation that FairCoop could continue to exchange FairCoin for
Euros at the 1.2 Euros-a-FairCoin rate was clearly unsustainable, and this problem
of arbitrage gives rise to the broader issue of convertibility.
Convertibility
Due to the commons itself not having any clear formal boundaries, for example
through a membership structure, two increasingly divergent ways of valuing Fair-
Coin existed in the same commons. For some participants in FairCoop the exter-
nal cryptocurrency exchange market price had greater importance than
FairCoop’s official community price. The divergence between the two prices
became a problem because of the commitments in place at that time for Fair-
Coop to meet the exchange of FairCoin to Euros for up to 1000 Euros per month
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for active FairCoop participants—which was subsequently reduced in 2019 (Fair-
Coop 2019). This reflects FairCoop and FairCoin’s ambiguous status as a postcapi-
talist commons and a tradeable cryptocurrency, which while seeking to build an
alternative economy based on shared values, also sought to offer a guaranteed
rate of exchange in Euros. FairCoop itself aimed to hack cryptocurrency
exchanges to generate Euros but was not clearly bound from them. In the sense
that FairCoop participants, actors leaving the FairCoop commons, or people unaf-
filiated with FairCoop, were free to sell or buy large quantities of FairCoin for Bit-
coin on external cryptocurrency exchanges.
This also highlights a wider question of convertibility and the relation to Euros,
despite the efforts to generate an alternative to state backed fiat currency. Pilikum
—an activist based in Coru~na, a region of Spain that had considerable success in
encouraging merchants of different kinds to use FairCoin, including a hairdresser,
a pub, an organic food shop and a range of other producers—reflected on these
experiences:
If we are going to a shop, this is a familiar shop they are trying to survive, a couple
and two children and they are just like fighting to earn some money. And I told them
you can spend your FairCoin in this shop that sells ecological food but this is so
expensive, when FairCoin was going up in value it was easy to say that, now it’s not
the same, so for them it’s easier to change to Euros and buy cheaper food.
The Euro has often assumed the position of an inescapable backdrop in FairCoop
discussions, debates and practices. In alternative currencies the quantitative opera-
tion of equivalence in the dominant state backed fiat currency is not one that is
ever really transcended (see Maurer 2003; Ould-Ahmed 2010). Maurer
(2003:334) argues that alternative currencies function like a mouse trap in that
they artificially restage the social relation, not in terms of ever doing away with
government backed fiat currency; but in staging the fiction differently. The restag-
ing of social relations of exchange involves generating different sites in which an
alternative currency is exchanged, and state backed fiat currency is not used. For
example, an individual may buy a beer from the bar of a social centre in Milan,
or Jura, or Athens, and make the purchase in FairCoin. The person at the bar
accepts the FairCoin on the basis of shared political values centred on the ideals
and values of FairCoop as a postcapitalist commons. In this exchange the fiction
that state backed fiat currency is necessarily the true equivalent of value—a fiction
that conceals the social relations of production and (re)production that generate
the exchange (Maurer 2003:332–333)—is restaged through a different token of
exchange which reflects different values. The similarity with the mousetrap for
Maurer (2003:334) is that in laying the mouse trap you artificially restage the
scene of the crime in which the mouse captures the piece of food. The key anal-
ogy is not in the catching of the mouse but in the laying of the trap, in setting
up the social relation of exchange; but on this occasion an alternative currency
will be exchanged. FairCoop had an additional (more ambitious element) which
meant that FairCoin was intended to function more like a cat, the idea was to
capture and utilise the capital inflow from external cryptocurrency exchange trad-
ing of FairCoin, to generate capital from external markets to support FairCoop as
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an expanding commons. In other words, it assumed an increasing inflow of capi-
tal into the commons from a rising cryptocurrency exchange market value of Fair-
Coin, to sustain FairCoop’s expansion. The functioning of the commons itself
became dependent on an increasingly favourable valuation of FairCoin by capital,
a problem that—as we will see—was compounded by insufficient commons
boundaries.
Boundaries in Postcapitalist Commons
The argument here is not that postcapitalist commons cannot seek to extract cap-
ital from external markets, but that sustainable postcapitalist commons need to
be far more resilient to unfavourable dynamics in relation to capital, and that this
resilience could be better secured through more clearly rule bound and delimited
capital filtering. Returning to Ostrom’s (1990) principle of commons boundaries,
a key component of which is delimiting how resources are extracted, one of the
key resources here is capital, in the form of Euros. Ostrom’s efforts to deduce from
empirical cases some design principles for sustainable CPRs is an approach that
helps us to think differently about how self-organised postcapitalist commons can
be made sustainable and we thus propose some additional postcapitalist design
principles in light of the clear limits of the FairCoop case.
The first additional design principle of postcapitalist commons boundaries is
that there must be a more resilient relation to capital, one which is not ulti-
mately dependent on increasing capital returns. Alternative economic proposals
have emerged for discussion within FairCoop in light of the problems of the
two-price model. As FairCoin continues to receive little investment on cryptocur-
rency exchanges, proposals have been developed to try to take FairCoin off
exchanges entirely and develop it into a fully-fledged mutual credit system
known as FairCredit (Monteiro and James 2018). Here the GetFairCoin website
and local node POE would provide the means to exchange from government
backed fiat currency to FairCoin, and users would then be able to transfer their
FairCoin into a negative value in FairCredits, which could then be exchanged for
goods and services with other participants. One counter argument against mov-
ing to a fully-fledged mutual credit system that has been raised within the com-
munity is that it would be impossible to remove FairCoin from cryptocurrency
exchanges entirely and some trading would inevitably continue. To have any
hope of addressing this aspect the FairCredit system would have to have tighter
relations of reciprocal obligation and exchange based on clear commons bound-
aries, probably with a membership structure of some description; but it remains
to be seen how this would operate in practice. In another relatively popular but
rather complex proposal known as the Fairo, FairCoin would fluctuate in a loga-
rithmic rate around 35% above cryptocurrency exchange market price, and
goods and services would be priced in Fairo (Fairo 2019). The Fairo could be a
thousandth of the basic cost of living in a given region agreed upon by consen-
sus in different local nodes. Thus, it would be a three-way process of pricing:
Price good or service in Fairo; convert Fairo to FairCoin (with FairCoin priced
35% above the current external cryptocurrency exchange rate); exchange in
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FairCoin to complete transaction. This would better address the challenges
around diverging and unsustainable price differences that emerged within the
two-price model, since FairCoin’s value within FairCoop would hover 35% above
its external cryptocurrency exchange market value, while FairCoop merchants
would price and exchange in Fairo, which would give them some protection
from the volatility of FairCoin trading on external cryptocurrency exchanges.
While the Fairo proposal is clearly complex, one key aspect of Ostrom’s (1990)
CPR self-governance cases is that the models necessary to ensure a sustainable
commons are often complex. Both these economic models seek to address a
broader design principle, which is that the sustainability of postcapitalist com-
mons cannot be dependent on an increasingly favourable valuation by capital;
such commons should have the potential to accommodate and adjust to a less
favourable valuation by capital.
Due to its reliance on increasing returns via hacking the cryptocurrency mar-
kets, FairCoop was also insufficiently bounded in terms of value framing. The Fair-
Coop principles were effective in attracting participants to the movement and
these were based around Integral Revolution, P2P Collaboration and hacker ethics
(FairCoop 2017a). But as the movement was essentially open and without formal
membership (Duran 2018), there was no clear means of establishing how these
values and ideals were incarnated into practices. FairCoop’s values were not made
explicit and binding enough to deliver the aims of the project, which was to offer
an alternative to capitalism. As Chris noted in respect of FairCoop “wanting to
manifest a different reality separate from the capitalist system”:
The expectation should be that we truly create the path in that direction that we truly
manifest that new reality and not just at the end we’re still part of the capitalist sys-
tem. I think it’s important that the expectation is that we make a great leap with what
we are doing because if we are not expecting that from ourselves, we will not go far
enough with it.
As FairCoop expanded in scale it became increasingly dependent on a favourable
valuation of FairCoin on external cryptocurrency exchanges to meet its exchange
commitments, thus diluting the principles of love, conviviality and solidarity (De
Angelis 2017a:339) that give life to the commons (Interview, Chris, 2019; Inter-
view, Pilikum, 2019). As a result, the social ties that bound the commons became
increasingly cracked. As Maro—a FairCoop activist in Madrid who has been heav-
ily involved in building FairCoop from 2015 onwards—described, “look at what
happened to us, now we are fighting each other because of the fucking Euros”.
As Maro went on to explain, at times merchants were brought into FairCoop
on the promise of FairCoin generating ever increasing returns in Euros on cryp-
tocurrency exchanges. She added that the FairCoop promise to meet exchange
commitments by converting FairCoin to Euros at a set rate led to a lack of appre-
ciation of the risky and disobedient aspects of the project:
Most of all in terms of disobedience ... in the sense of, we are creating an alternative
and we need to make some sacrifices. It means to have a cryptocurrency that you
don’t know how much it’s going to be valued.
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Part of the value framing of postcapitalist commons that was lacking—or at
least insufficiently explicit—is the necessity that commons values must come
before private incentives, which may entail unanticipated sacrifices in terms of
capital.
In conjunction with clearer value framing, it also becomes necessary for the
commons to ensure that these values are reflected and reinforced through alter-
native practices and technologies, which indicates a further principle of scalable
and sustainable postcapitalist commons boundaries missing from the FairCoop
example: Clear means of reputational feedback. Ostrom (1990) focuses on mem-
bership and sanction as design principles in CPR systems; but this is arguably
counter to some of the more communal, inclusive and anti-authoritarian anarchist
values in autonomous postcapitalist commons. That said, when making
exchanges and when converting to a scarce resource like Euros, some criterion of
access has to be established for the commons to remain sustainable. FairCoop
itself made unsustainable commitments to exchange FairCoin back to Euros for all
“FairCoop participants” (FairCoop 2019). We believe some means of peer2peer
assessment and feedback could be deployed to evaluate relative contribution to
the commons, which could form the basis of a collectively agreed system of
resource allocation, based on human need and assessment of contribution. For
example, if a developer had worked many hours and made a positive contribu-
tion—such as by significantly enhancing FairCoop’s online map software, which
enables people to easily identify retail outlets that accept FairCoin in different
cities—if this work was positively evaluated by the community they would then
move higher in the list of people who would have the opportunity to exchange
their FairCoin back to Euros. These exchanges back to Euros would have to work
in a manner that is sustainable and affordable rather than on the basis of an
unsustainable promise or guarantee. Within the Fairo proposal this would be at
35% above cryptocurrency exchange market rate and it would be funded at least
partly through monthly payments to FairCoop from participants who receive a
steady and sufficient income in state backed fiat currency to cover basic needs
(see Fairo 2019). New peer2peer reputational feedback mechanisms—which
would include scoring a participants’ contribution to the commons—can be one
means to determine access to limited commons resources (see Fairo 2019; Pazaitis
et al. 2017:111). This would potentially help to make scalable postcapitalist com-
mons more sustainable through positive feedback incentives that could support
the boundaries underpinning the commons, because it would be a transparent
means of determining how limited resources can be extracted.
Another key design principle of securing sustainable and scalable postcapitalist
commons boundaries and collectively establishing an appropriate “filtering mem-
brane” (De Angelis 2017b:228–229) for capital is transparency. FairCoop’s origi-
nal design had no shared or collectively transparent accounting system in which
active participants in different regions were aware of the limits to commons
resources. One element limiting this was a mystique that accompanied the princi-
pal founder of FairCoop, Enric Duran—who had personally risked a great deal to
generate alternative postcapitalist commons experiments, particularly through his
action against the banks in 2008. Yet this was also accompanied by a lack of
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collective understanding of the accounting processes, and what reserves FairCoop
actually had. As Guy noted:
Everybody believed in Enric 100% and everyone was just like, if there was a conflict
we’d just say: what do you think Enric? And just do what he said basically, you know,
which is probably not the best way to do a decentralised project, but he definitely
had the best kind of economic understanding of anybody at the time.
We would argue that a key principle for the sustainability of scalable postcapitalist
commons is that of collective participation or at the very least awareness of the
accounting process, principally through a collective understanding of risks and the
level of limited resources, in this case Euros. Accounting transparency is a crucial fac-
tor in determining how capital can best be selectively filtered into and extracted
from the commons, whilst retaining the sustainability of the commons itself.
Conclusions
In reflecting on the FairCoop and FairCoin case, the movement could be
described as a failure in that the initial model of hacking the cryptocurrency mar-
kets to build and sustain a postcapitalist commons clearly did not work as
planned. That said, as Chatterton (2016) argues, postcapitalist commons are
often characterised by risk taking and experimentation, and a key feature of
experimentation is that particular projects may not work out as intended; experi-
mentation in short is also about the freedom to fail, provided of course that
things can be learnt from what did not work. Furthermore, as Khasnabish and
Haiven (2015:24) note, it is a mistake to evaluate social movements only by their
stated objectives, since this ignores the ways in which they generate and sustain
progressive and radical platforms of “social relationality and reproduction”, which
can generate future, improved commons experiments. Furthermore, from the lack
of sustainability that was evident in the FairCoop case we can take some impor-
tant lessons in terms of future efforts to generate scalable postcapitalist commons
through peer2peer technologies.
This paper has highlighted a tension between postcapitalist commons expan-
sion and boundaries. If a postcapitalist commons expands too quickly without suf-
ficient boundaries from capital, its relation to capital is likely to become
unsustainable. While there are clearly limitations to deducing design principles in
terms of postcapitalist commons boundaries from a close investigation of a single
case, we nevertheless think this is worth attempting because of the importance
and distinctiveness of FairCoop in making a rare attempt through FairCoin to gen-
erate a postcapitalist commons alternative that is scalable (Chatterton and Pusey
2020; Gerhardt 2020; Griziotti 2019). Having said this, and subject to further
research into future postcapitalist commons experiments attempting to scale, we
think that from this case it is possible to outline some additional design principles
in regard to postcapitalist commons boundaries:
• An economic model that is as resilient as possible to a divergent evaluation by
capital and decreasing capital returns.
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• A clear value framing in which the values around the maintenance of the com-
mons are placed above private interests in securing capital, and this must be
true for new participants as much as existing ones.
• Means to ensure that these commons principles are reflected in practices, we
have suggested peer2peer reputational feedback as a potential way of doing this.
• There must be transparency and clarity around the accounting process in
which all participants are aware of how limited capital resources are and
potential risks arising from this.
Gerhardt (2020:696) argues that overcoming “the apparatus involved in the
monopolisation of monetary value” is a key task in building postcapitalist com-
mons, but clearly our investigation into the FairCoop case has shown the consid-
erable challenges of doing this. What the case also highlights is the partiality of
postcapitalist alternative currencies, in restaging the fiction of the dominant mon-
etary system (Maurer 2003) without transcending it. This is arguably a feature of
postcapitalist projects in general, in operating within, while trying to work towards
an after, capitalism. That said, the postcapitalist peer2peer alternative currency
space is an experimental and generative one with continuing different lines of
flight (see for example Economic Space Agency 2020; Fairo 2019; Holo 2018)
that potentially take us beyond the confines of site-specific commons alternatives
(Gerhardt 2020). In suggesting some further design principles for greater bound-
aries from capital in postcapitalist commons, which we argue are necessary to be
both sustainable and scalable, we hope to have made a contribution to rethinking
and advancing this vibrant field of activist experimentation.
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Endnote
1 The case of the delisting from Bittrex as a result of refusing to meet particular regulatory
requirements gives rise to some important issues surrounding the relation between FairCoop
as a postcapitalist commons and the state. Given its collectivist anarchist ethos and the history
of Enric Duran, thus far FairCoop has opted not to comply (where legally possible) with state
regulation. That said, if FairCoin was ever to become more widely used the questions around
its boundedness and autonomy from the state would doubtless arise with increasing force.
How a postcapitalist commons determines its relation to the state clearly depends on the par-
ticular, context-specific challenges to autonomy the state may pose (see De Angelis
2017a:230), the collective decision-making within the commons itself, as well as the potential
opportunities the state may present for the commons in given instances.
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